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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
This paper introduces a definition of affordability based on the microeconomic theory 
of the consumer.  We replace utility maximization with effectiveness maximization 
and discuss our conceptualization in terms of a cost-effectiveness framework.  We 
convert our original ideas into a more useful degree (amount) of affordability (i.e., we 
ask not “Is it affordable?” but “How affordable is it?”).  This allows us to attach 
meaning to, and interest in, the concept of an affordability index—or the 
measurement of the degree of affordability. 
Introduction 
There is currently intense debate over whether various government programs (e.g., 
health care, defense, and the environment) are affordable.  There are also questions about 
the long-term affordability of Social Security and Medicare. Given that affordability is at the 
forefront of many of these programs, it is imperative that we can define and quantify it.   
Affordability is a concept that everyone seems to understand, but that everyone also has 
trouble precisely defining and even more trouble quantifying.  Webster’s defines affordability 
as “the ability to manage or to bear the cost of without serious loss or detriment.”  But this 
begs the question; what is “serious loss or detriment?”  This ambiguity is prevalent in the 
affordability literature.  For example, Kroshl and Pandolfini (2000) note that 
No single formula precisely defines an affordable system.  As a micro-concept, 
an affordable system is procured when needed within a budget, operated at a 
desired performance level, and maintained and supported within an allocated life-
cycle budget. As a macro-concept, affordable systems are constrained by top-
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line budgets, require timing for competing uses of resources, and must contend 
with the dimension of inflexibility in near-term budgets, although long-term 
considerations may make many programs justifiable. 
Redman and Straton (2001) define affordability as  
that characteristic of a product or service that enables consumers to: (1) procure 
it when they need it; (2) use it to meet their performance requirements at a level 
of quality that they demand; (3) use it whenever they need it over the expected 
life span of the product or service; and (4) procure it for a reasonable cost that 
falls within their budget for all needed products or services. 
With regard to defense programs, the relatively recent emphasis on affordability1 is in 
marked contrast to the Department of Defense’s behavior during the Cold War.  Then, the 
emphasis was on effectiveness, and cost, if considered at all, was just another variable.  
The end of the Cold War brought a defense drawdown and accompanying budget cuts, 
causing an increased emphasis on cost in resource allocation decisions.  This emphasis 
was formalized in a July 19, 1995, memo titled “Policy on Cost-Performance Trade-Off” 
signed by the then Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology.    The memo introduced the cost-as-an-independent-variable (CAIV) initiative.  
CAIV mandated that decisions be made considering both total life-cycle costs (TLCC) and 
effectiveness as the decision variables.  While CAIV made TLCC visible, it allowed for trade-
offs between effectiveness and TLCC.  Thus, if decision-makers put enough weight on 
effectiveness, they could still approve systems that were not necessarily affordable, leading 
the DoD to revise the concept of affordability.  The DoD defines affordability as “the degree 
to which the life-cycle cost of an acquisition program is in consonance with the long-range 
investment and force structure plans of the Department of Defense or individual DoD 
Components.” 
It is interesting that the U.S. Department of Defense has difficulty in identifying what 
is or is not affordable.  In our private lives, we all know implicitly what affordability means.  
For example, in deciding whether to buy a new car, I have many options, including keeping 
my old car rather than buying a new one.  To make my decision, I must decide how much I 
am willing to spend on a car as well as decide what attributes I desire in a car.  One of the 
options I could consider might be a luxury car.  In evaluating the affordability of a luxury car, 
I would determine whether it fit into my budget.  At this point, things get a little complicated.  
What does fit in my budget mean?  It might mean that I have already determined the 
maximum amount I am willing to spend on a car.  In that case, the luxury car either costs no 
more than my pre-determined amount or it doesn’t (i.e., is affordable or isn’t).  On the other 
hand, I might have in mind an amount I am willing to spend on a car, but I might also be 
willing to make trade-offs with other items in my budget if the alternative exceeds my pre-
determined amount.  For example, I might be willing to forego eating in restaurants, going to 
the movies, etc., in order to buy the luxury car.  In that case, I would want the utility of a 
combination of goods that includes the luxury car to offer at least as much utility as any 
combination of goods that does not include the luxury car.  Therefore, the luxury car is 
affordable if, after making trade-offs, it fits in my budget and produces at least as much total 
utility as I would have without it.  This leads to a workable definition of affordability:  A 
system is affordable if, after making any desired tradeoffs, it fits in the budget and offers at 
least as much utility as the current mix of systems. 
                                                
1 For another view of affordability and an excellent review of the affordability literature, see Melese (2010). 
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Our goal in this paper is to develop an operational definition of affordability that lends 
itself to quantification.  We first lay out a model of choice that is the foundation of modern 
economic reasoning. We next apply this formulation to a defense budget decision.  Finally, 
we construct a quantifiable, operational affordability measure. 
The Model 
Assume that the government defense agency currently produces or purchases a 
good 1q  at a unit cost of 1c  that provides social utility (i.e., contributes to the defense of the 
country).  Suppose a new good, 
2
q , at a unit cost of 2c , is available, where 2q can be 
independent of, a substitute for, or a complement to 1q .  Assume also that the agency 
currently has a budget of ,B  which it uses to purchase or produce a quantity ∗1q  of the good 
1
q .  Assuming a social utility function ),( 21 qqfU = , the agency faces three possible 
situations.  The first is that 
2
q  is not affordable, in which case the agency will not produce or 
purchase it.  In the second situation, 
2
q  is affordable, and social utility is maximized by 
partially substituting 
2
q  for 
1
q .  In this case, both 
1
q  and 
2
q  will be produced or purchased.  
In the third case, 
2
q  dominates 
1
q and social utility is maximized by discontinuing  1q and 
producing or purchasing only 
2
q .  We examine each case in more detail below. 
Case 1: q2 Is Not Affordable 
If Bc >2 , 2q is clearly not affordable unless funds are available to increase B .  If the 
situation is as shown in Figure 1, however, the affordability of 
2
q  is not clear. In Figure 1, ∗1q  
is the quantity of 1q  given a budget level of B  and a price of 1c  with 2q  not included (i.e., it 
is the status quo).  Including 
2
q  results in the budget line and social indifference curves 
shown.  )0,( 1
∗= qfU  is the indifference curve representing the combinations of 1q  and 2q  
that produce as much utility as ∗1q .  Note that there are combinations of 1q  and 2q  that 
satisfy the budget constraint.  Many of the definitions of affordability noted above define 
affordability by whether it fits within the budget constraint.  Under these definitions, 
2
q  is 
affordable.  By our definition of affordability, however, 
2
q  is not affordable because, whereas 
2
q  fits within the budget constraint, adding 
2
q  does not achieve a utility level at least as 
high as ∗1q .  There is no combination of 1q  and 2q  that both satisfies the budget constraint 
and produces as much utility as ∗1q .  With a budget level of B , adding 2q results in lower 
utility; therefore, 
2
q  does not meet our definition of affordability, and 
2
q  is not produced.  
This explains a lot of seemingly paradoxical behavior.  For example, in the debate over 
health care some note that there are families and individuals who seem to have enough 
income to purchase health insurance yet do not.  The reason is that their expected level of 
utility with health insurance in their mix of consumption goods is lower that the mix without it 
given their income. 
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Figure 1. Case 1 
Case 2: q2 Is Affordable, Leading to the Production or Purchase of Both q1 and q2 
This case is shown in Figure 2.  As before, )0,( 1
∗= qfU  is the indifference curve 
showing the combinations of 1q  and 2q  that produce as much utility as 
∗
1q .  In this case, 
however, there are combinations of 1q  and 2q  within the budget constraint that produce as 
much or more social utility as does 
∗
1q .  Point A is the combination of 1q  and 2q  that 
produces maximum utility for a budget level of B ; however, any combination of 1q  and 2q  
in the area between the indifference curve )0,( 1
∗= qfU  and the budget line B  (shaded 
area) produces more utility and costs as much or less than 
∗
1q .  Thus, 2q  is affordable. 
 
Figure 2. Case 2 
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Case 3: q2 Dominates q1 
Given the contours of the indifference curves and the slope of the budget line in 
Figure 3, ∗2q  satisfies the budget constraint while providing more utility than 
∗
1q  or any 
combination of 1q  and 2q  that satisfies the budget constraint.  Indeed, any quantity of 
2
q between ′2q  and 
∗
2q  costs less and provides more utility than does
∗
1q .  In this case, only 
2
q  is produced. 
 
Figure 3. Case 3 
In all three cases, the combinations of 1q  and 2q that cost as much or less than the 
status quo lie in the triangle formed by the budget line and the 1q  and 2q  axes, that is, by 
the origin ∗1q  and 
∗
2q .  The combinations of 1q  and 2q that meet our definition of affordability 
are contained in the area between the budget line and the indifference curve (the shaded 
area in Figures 2 and 3).  This leads directly to a quantifiable measure of affordability:  It is 
the ratio of the set of combinations of 1q  and 2q  that produce at least as much utility as 
∗
1q  
to the set of all combinations of 1q  and 2q  that cost as much or less than
∗
1q .  This ratio 
defines an affordability index a  such that .10 <≤ a  
Extensions 
More Than One Good in the Status Quo Budget 
In this case, 1q  represents a vector of goods.  Let iq , ni ,...,1=  be the existing 
goods, with ∗1q  representing the optimal mix of the current goods.  Introducing 2q into the 
mix leads to the same three cases described above except that the tradeoffs are now 
among multiple goods. 
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Affordability Over Time 
Many affordability decisions involve long-lived assets and therefore affordability must 
be assessed over multiple time periods. Affordability over time is much more complicated 
than affordability over a single time period.  In this situation, every time period must be 
assessed for the existence of the three cases above.  By our definition of affordability, if in 
any one-time period the first case holds, 
2
q  is not affordable.  However, if it is possible to 
alter the budget in a particular period where 
2
q  is not affordable so that it becomes 
affordable without making it unaffordable in another period, then it meets our criteria for 
affordability. 
Illustrative Example 
Let the measure of effectiveness for each alternative system be described by an 
exponential function with two nonnegative parameters ia  and ic : 
)(1)( ii qgii eqv
−−=      (1) 
where 
.)( ibiiii qaqg =  
The parameter ia  determines the rate at which iv  increases with .i
b
iq   The 
parameter ib  affects the shape of v i  in that 0.1>ib  produces S-shaped curves while 1≤ib  
produces concave growth curves.  This function is general enough to exhibit both increasing 
and decreasing marginal effectiveness. 
Let the joint effectiveness of the two systems be described by 
),(
21
211),( qqfeqqv −−=  
where 
).()()()(),( 2211221121 qgqgdqgqgqqf ⋅⋅++=    (2) 
The parameter d  represents synergistic affects between 1q  and .2q   If 0>d  then 
1q  and  2q  reinforce one another and produce a higher measure of effectiveness for the 
same ),( 21 qq   than when .0=d   This joint function exhibits two important traits.  First, it 
exhibits eventually decreasing marginal effectiveness along any direction in the 
−),( 21 qq plane. Second, )(),( iiji qvqqv →  as 0→jq   so that the joint measure of 
effectiveness reduces to the appropriate individual measure of effectiveness when one 
alternative is removed. These effectiveness measures are defined for all non-negative 
),( 21 qq  but we will restrict our consideration to only integer values of 1q  and .2q  
Suppose the current system is such that 17.01 =a  and 6.01 =b  while the new, more 
effective, system is such that 21.02 =a  and .8.02 =b  Also assume .3.0=d   This produces 
a joint measure of effectiveness with the effectiveness contours presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Contour Plot for v(q1, q2) of Equation 2 
Suppose the budget is 10=B  and assume that the current system inventory is 
101 =q  so .492.0)10(1 =v   Is the new alternative affordable?  To answer this we need to 
specify .2c  Suppose there are four cases to consider: 5,2,12 =c  and .10   Each produces a 
budget constraint line between )0,10(),( 21 =qq  and ),,0(),( max221 qqq = where 
2,4,5,10max2 =q  or ,1   respectively. 
The new system is affordable if there are ),( 21 qq  combinations for which 
492.0)10()0,10(),( 121 ==≥ vvqqv     (3) 
and 
.102211 ≤+ qcqc      (4) 
Figure 5 presents the situation graphically. The region for which 492.0),( 21 ≥qqv  is 
depicted by the set of closely spaced contours (at intervals of 0.004). All combinations of 
),( 21 qq  for which 492.0),( 21 <qqv  occupy the region with no contours. The four regions for 
which ),( 21 qq  satisfy Equation 4 are identified by their respective lines. The situation shows 
that 2q  is not affordable when .102 =c  There are no integer solutions other than 
),0,10(),( 21 =qq  that satisfy Equation 3 and Equation 4.  If ,52 =c  we find 2q  is affordable 
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at ).1,5(),( 21 =qq   If ,22 =c  we find 14 integer solutions, other than ),0,10(),( 21 =qq  that 
are affordable.  Finally, if ,12 =c  there are 44 combinations, other than ),0,10(),( 21 =qq  that 
are affordable. The answer to the question of whether the new system is affordable clearly 
depends on .2c   If  102 =c , then “no.” But if 102 <c , then “yes.” 
 
Figure 5. The Affordability of q2 when c2 = 10, 5, 2, and 1.0 
If a system is deemed affordable, then the next question we ask is: How affordable is 
it?  The answer is given by the affordability measure we developed in Section 2.  The 
affordability measure is given by the area defined by Equation 3 and Equation 4 relative to 
the area defined in Equation 4 alone. The calculation of this area is an exercise in freshman 
calculus, but a useful approximation obtained by simple computation. All we need do is 
cover the area }100;100|),{( 2121 ≤≤≤≤=Ω qqqq  with a grid of equally spaced points and 
count how many grid points lay within each area.  If =N  the number of grid points satisfying 
Equation 3 and Equation 4, and =M  the number of grid points that lay on or below the 
respective budget line, then MNA /=  is an estimate of the measure of affordability.  The 
finer the grid, the better the approximation.  Table 1 illustrates this effect.  )(xA  denotes the 
value of A  obtained using a grid of width .x   The third column is the result of using an 
integer-based grid while the fourth and fifth columns present estimates for A  using an 
increasingly finer grid. 
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Note that N  is an approximation to the area )10,0(),(|),{( 2121 vqqvqq ≥=N  and 
}2211 qcqcB +≥ , while M  is an approximation to the area }.|),{( 221121 qcqcBqq +≥=M   
Because ⊂N M , it will always be the case that 
.10 ≤≤ A  
Affordability depends on more than just the alternative cost, ,2c  and it is of value to 
use the model to study the effect of variations in other factors.  For example, what is the 
change in the situation if the effectiveness of 2q  is further enhanced?  Suppose the design 
of the alternative system can be improved so that 31.02 =a  and 2c  while all other 
parameters remain the same. This situation yields the measures of affordability in Table 2.  
We now find that even at 0.52 =c  the new system has a modest measure of affordability. 
Table 2. Affordability Measure (a2 = 0.31) 
 
Of course, there are many other possibilities to consider. Not only is it of interest to 
understand the affect of the variation in a single variable, but also the affect of a combination 
of variables varying simultaneously. In the end we require a complete sensitivity analysis. 
Instead of pursuing these matters here, we prefer to consider the incorporation of 
uncertainty. To a certain extent a study of uncertainty and its effects on affordability is quite 
similar to a sensitivity analysis, but more focused. 
Affordability-Effectiveness Analysis 
Our paired-comparison development of affordability extends easily to the situation 
where we have multiple competing alternatives. Let there be a set of K  candidate 
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alternatives, each described by their overall effectiveness and discounted life-cycle cost: 
}.,1;,{ Kkcv kk =   The relative cost-effectiveness of the members is assessed in the usual 
way by viewing a scatter diagram plot of the members of this set in cost-effectiveness space 
(i.e., a plot of kv  versus kc ). We wish to replace this plot with a scatter diagram plot in 
affordability-effectiveness space; that is, a plot of kv  versus .kA  This is achieved by 
repeating the paired-comparison analysis process for each of the candidate systems in 
order to obtain their description in terms of the ordered pairs }.,1;,{ KkAv kk =   We illustrate 
this using the data of the previous section. 
Let the original system and the three candidate systems be described as before by 
Equation 1 and Equation 2 with parameters as given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Multiple Candidate System Example 
 
The evaluation of the three new systems gives .054.0,343.0,495.0 321 === AAA  
The respective cost-effectiveness and affordability-effectiveness plots are presented in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Cost-Effectiveness and Affordability-Effectiveness 
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Note how each may be viewed as the mirror image of the other. Both exhibit an 
efficient frontier, although with the opposite orientation with respect to the preferences of the 
horizontal axis. In the cost-effectiveness plot the preferred direction is upward and to the left 
while in the affordability-effectiveness plot the preferred direction is upward and to the right. 
If the apparent mirror image of the two plots of Figure 6 is a pattern that always 
appears, then one could argue that the information produced by the affordability analysis 
offers nothing beyond the information contained in the cost-effectiveness analysis. The 
efficient set is the same in both plots and the trade-offs are mirror images of one another: Is 
the increase in effectiveness in choosing Alternative 3 over Alternative 2 worth the increase 
in cost? As opposed to: Is the increase in effectiveness in choosing Alternative 3 over 
Alternative 2 worth the loss in affordability?  A small change in our example shows this not 
to be the case. Let the cost of Alternative 2 increase to 0.32 =c  and let that cost of 
Alternative 4 decrease to .0.94 =c   Application of our analysis to this new situation gives the 
results presented in Figure 7.  Now we find a different efficient set in affordability-
effectiveness space.  In fact, Alternative 2 is now no longer efficient—it is dominated by 
Alternative 3.  This is a significant alteration of the cost-effectiveness situation: the efficient 
set is now composed of only Alternatives 3 and 4. The decision to be made now concerns 
only two alternatives. 
 
Figure 7. Cost-Effectiveness and Affordability-Effectiveness With c2 = 3.0 and c4 = 
9.0 
Uncertainty and Affordability Risk 
Our affordability concept accommodates uncertainty in an obvious way. All we need 
to do is interpret the occasion when N∈),( 21 qq   as an event and the metric MNA /=  as 
a random variable. Now the determination of an alternative’s affordability is equivalent to 
calculating the }0{1}0{ =−=≠ NN PP  or determining the ).0(1)0( =−=> APAP   Since 
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affordability is a binary concept—either Ν),( 21 ∈qq  or not—an alternative is affordable if 
there exists only a single point for which .),( 21 N∈qq  
Of more use to the decision-maker is an assessment of the affordability measure. An 
alternative with a high measure of affordability implies that there are many combinations of 
),( 21 qq  that will be preferred to the status quo. In the presence of uncertainty this can mean 
a higher likelihood for a satisfactory outcome—one in which the chosen ),( 21 qq  actually 
produces at least as high effectiveness as the status quo. Thus, it is of some interest to the 
decision-maker to ascertain )( HL AP αα ≤≤ for various ).,( HL αα  This is equivalent to 
assessing the quantiles of A  and this requires the distribution function of .A  The 
assessment of affordability risk now takes explicit form. 
 AFFORDABILITY RISK (Type 1). The likelihood that an alternative is 
unaffordable: 
).0( =AP  
 AFFORDABILITY RISK (Type 2). The probability that the measure of 
affordability is less than some minimally acceptable level: 
).( minα<AP  
The assessment of both types can be accomplished in many ways, but we find 
simulation modeling particularly attractive. 
Simulation modeling makes good use of all available information concerning the 
uncertainties of the situation. It incorporates available theoretical results, subjectively 
assessed information, and assumptions the decision-maker is willing to make to fill in the 
gaps in required information. In our present context, there often are probability models 
representing estimations errors, particularly if life-cycle cost estimates rely on statistical 
techniques as regression in building cost estimating relations (CER). Moreover, the analyst 
often has knowledge of the measurement errors and imprecision in the evaluation of 
effectiveness. 
An Illustration of Affordability Risk Assessment 
We now illustrate the simulation modeling approach using our previous, deterministic 
example. The main issue of concern is computation of the probability distribution of .A  This 
is all the information we need to assess any statistic relating to ,A  especially those we use 
to represent our two measures of risk. Simulation modeling provides only an approximation 
of the statistic of interest, but the accuracy of this approximation is limited only by the 
amount of time and computation we allocate to the task. 
All parameters relating to the existing system are assumed known with certainty:  
.1,6.0,17.0,10 1111 ==== cbaq   The nominal values for the new system are as before:  
8.0,21.0 22 == ba  and .3.0=d   Cost is considered uncertain within the range: .101 2 ≤≤ c   
Although the decision-maker is willing to believe the certainty attached to the parameters of 
the existing system, all parameters of the new system are viewed as only nominal. 
We present six runs illustrating risk assessment scenarios under a variety of input 
specifications. Each illustrates the type of information the decision-maker may use: (1) 
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assumptions based on little or no prior information, (2) subjective assessment of related 
information, or (3) available hard data provided by the analyst (e.g., life-cycle cost estimation 
error and effectiveness estimation errors). The first three scenarios depict a situation where 
the decision-maker is willing to accept the effectiveness estimate for the new system )( 2q  
but not its cost estimate nor the value of the future budget. Run 1 assumes the decision-
maker is willing to state a value for the minimum, most likely, and maximum value for 2c  and 
.B   This type of prior information can be expressed as a triangular probability distribution or 
a Beta distribution parameterized to accept specification in three-parameter form (instead of 
the traditional two-parameter form). This type of Beta is referred to as a Program Evaluation 
and Review Technique (PERT) distribution. In Run 2 the decision-maker is willing to specify 
only a minimum and maximum for 2c  while believing that any value between these limits is 
equally likely. This information is represented by a uniform probability distribution. Run 3 
extends this less informative prior to the budget as well. The last three runs illustrate the 
situation when the decision-maker no longer accepts the effectiveness estimate for the new 
system but is willing to employ the parameters as the most likely values in PERT 
distributions. Runs 4 and 5 illustrate pessimistic views of the new system effectiveness 
estimate. Run 6 illustrates the amount of improvement required in ,2a  relative to Runs 4 and 
5, to reduce the risks to acceptable levels (assuming a decision-maker who can tolerate a 
level as high as 0.05 or 5%). Each run employs 5,000 Monte Carlo trials with Roman 
hypercube sampling. 
Table 4. Simulation Scenarios 
 
The results are presented in Table 4 using four statistics. Columns 2 and 3 are the 
limits of the 95% confidence interval for .A  These define the limits of the interval on the real 
line within which we will experience the actual (realized) value of .A   The fourth column 
gives the estimate of Type 1 Risk (i.e., the likelihood the new system will be unaffordable). 
The last column presents the estimate of Type 2 Risk (i.e., the likelihood that actual A  will 
be less than what is minimally acceptable—be specified as 0.1). The relative frequency 
distributions of A  are presented in Figures 8–13. 
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Table 5. Affordability Statistics 
 
Comparing the results of Runs 1–2 demonstrates an important insight for decision-
makers: the amount of probabilistic information provided affects the assessed risk. Both the 
PERT and uniform distribution have the same range of values but the PERT distribution 
provides more information: the most likely value, as well as the upper and lower bounds. As 
a consequence, the PERT distribution decreases the likelihood of values at, or near, the 
extremes of the distribution while placing more likelihood on values nearer the most likely 
value. This manifests itself in less assessed risk: a more narrow 95% confidence interval for 
Aand a very small value for ).1.0( ≤AP  Using the uniform distribution for 2c  represents a 
reduction in information and leads to more assessed risk: a wider confidence interval for A  
shifted towards zero and higher ).1.0( ≤AP  Run 3 represents a further reduction in 
information and increase in assessed risk: the 95% confidence interval for A  now includes 
zero with 029.0)0( ==AP  and .404.0)1.0( =≤AP  
Runs 4–5 illustrate the situation where the decision-maker does not have complete 
confidence in the estimate of effectiveness for the new system. Actual 2a  may be as much 
as 19% below the nominal while only 5% above the nominal, but its most likely value at the 
nominal estimate. Likewise, 2b  may be as much as 19% below nominal or 6% above with a 
most likely value at the nominal estimate. Run 4 is to be compared with Run 3 to see the 
effect on risk when uncertainty in effectiveness is added to the analysis. Run 5 is to be 
compared with Run 4 to see the effect of an even more pessimistic budget environment. 
Run 6 addresses risk from a different perspective. The question here is the amount 
of increased effectiveness that must be offered by the new system to lower the risk to an 
acceptable level. We illustrate using only 2a  to keep a narrow scope. We find the new 
system reduces risk significantly if 40.020.0 2 ≤≤ a  with most likely value 0.35. This 
produces 01.)0( ≤=AP  whereas ,05.0)1.0(  ≤AP  presenting a considerably less risky 
situation than Runs 4 and 5. This result is only suggestive—a more detailed analysis also 
involving 2b  would be required to more completely answer the question. 
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Figure 9. Run 2 Affordability Measure 
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Figure 11. Run 4 Affordability Measure 
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Figure 13. Run 6 Affordability Measure 
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